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I
Introduction
The powerful forces of change moving through world affairs today
are placing a deep imprint upon the United Nations in diverse ways. With
the influx of the large number of new nations, each urgently in need of
economic and technical assistance to consolidate the bases of their inde-
pendence, the world organization is being called upon to aid in the
planning and undergirding of economic and social growth on a scale un-
precedented in the annals of international collaboration. Nothing in
the history of the League of Nations9 or heretofore in the activities
of the United Nations, compares with the magnitude of the needs and
demands that are confronting the United Nations in this connection.
The crisis in the Congo in the summer of 1960, and the admission
to the United Nations on the opening day of the Fifteenth General
Assembly of 13 newly independent nations in Africa, graphically under-
scored two facets of the changing patterns of politics bearing upon the
future of United Nations economic collaboration.
The tragic events in the Congo had two consequences in this regard.
The crisis, on the one hand, necessitated not only the hasty assemblage
of the United Nations International Force to restore and maintain peace
and order, but also the mobilization of a large team of technical and
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economic experts from many agencies and countries to assist in public
administration, public health, education, transportation, agriculture,
and a wide range of other basic services. This had the immediate effect
of compelling the United Nations to raise its sights on economic and
technical assistance in Africa from the meagre $2.5 million Special
African Assistance Program which Secretary-General Hammarskjold was
tentatively broaching to emergency aid on the scale of $100-200 million
for the Congo alone for the coming twelve months.
The admission of the 13 African states, plus Cyprus, underlined
the politics of economic collaboration in a quite different way. It
brought the number of African states in the United Nations to 17, and
raised to 43 the membership of the Asian-African nations. If there are
added to this number the 20 Latin American states, which also have an
interest in economic and technical assistance, there can be said to be
63 Member states, not counting the Eastern European countries, with a
direct interest in obtaining such assistance.
Taken altogether these states comprise just under two-thirds of
the total membership of the General Assembly. Although this is not
enough to hold a controlling majority, if all are united, it is
sufficient to defeat any proposal which the great majority of these
states may not like. With the admission of Nigeria and the Republics
of Mali and Senegal, this combination will have just over two-thirds
of the Assembly membership. There is no assurance, of course, that
all or even the preponderant majority of these states will stand
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together. They are hardly likely to do so on many, or even most
occasions, judging from past voting records. Nevertheless, the changed
political circumstances must be borne in mind. It is quite possible that
some other Members of the United Nations may make common cause with some
of these states on certain questions of economic and social cooperation.
In any event, the countries that have a vested interest in economic and
technical assistance are in a position to exert significant political
leverage in the General Assembly if they can concert their forces -- or
to the extent that they can do so.
These two episodes are but single elements, among others, providing
a new focus for and a changing political framework within which the
economic role of the United Nations must now function.
If the Congo situation has demanded that the United Nations re-
assess the scale of its assistance to politically developing nations, the
accession of new Members has added weight to the already serious problem
of Asian-African under-representation on the Economic and Social Council.
The large increment is bound to make the present representation arrange-
ments appear more inequitable than they have seemed heretofore to the
states of this large bi-continental area and to add impetus to the move-
ment for amending the Charter to increase the membership of the Economic
and Social Council.
In 1959 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
made loans totalling over $700 million to help create new industries,
raise production, improve communication facilities, or assist agricultural
development. Beginning in 1961 the Expanded Program of Technical Assis-
will
tance and the Special Fund for Economic Development/have undertaken to
operate on a "modest" target of $100 million a year, toward which the
United States has pledged $40 million. This is but a proverbial *drop
in the bucket* measured against the needs of the underdeveloped countries.
This is evidenced by United Nations' statistics that the average of
bilateral economic aid extended annually between 1954-1957 in grants and
loans amounted to $2,827 million.
That the United Nations must think in much larger terms was made
clear by President Eisenhower in addressing the General Assembly on
September 22, 1960, when he affirmed that the United States was ready
to join in (1) expanding the functions of the Special Fund and the Ex-.
panded Technical Assistance Program, (2) expanding and placing on a
permanent basis the United Nations Operational and Executive Personnel
Program for making trained administrators available to the newly develop-
ing countries, (3) encouraging the International Bank and the International
Monetary Fund to provide added counsel and assistance in shaping long-
term African development programs as states qualify for their aid, and
(4) developing an expanded program of educational assistance. Although
his Five Point program was directed in first instance to the pressing
needs of the new African countries, the President added: 'We must carry
forward and intensify our programs of assistance for the economic and
social development in freedom of other areas, particularly in Latin
America, Asia and the Middle East.*
-As the needs for assistance have grown, the importance of the
Economic and Social Council in the total UN context has also risen. This
seems likely to continue further in the years to come as a consequence of
the heavy preoccupation the African, Asian, Middle Eastern and Latin
American states have with economic growth and social advancement.
Ii
The Role of the Economic and Social Council
The Economic and Social Council was designed by the founders of
the United Nations to serve as a catalytic agent that would bring together
states in need of assistance and states in a position to extend aid or to
be of help in mobilizing resources and counsel for these purposes.
It was intended that this Council should become a center for inter-
national cooperation in solving a wide range of international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, scientific and humanitarian character.
And it was expected to promote and encourage as well "respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion."
No organ of the United Nations, other than the General Assembly,
has a broader range of subject matter or duties imposed upon it than does
the Economic and Social Council. It is not surprising that the Council,
or its subsidiary committees, are active for a good part of each year.
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Through its own actions, as well as those of the regional Economic
Commissions which are responsible to it and the Specialized Agencies which
are coordinated by it, the Economic and Social Council is in a strategic
position to recommend, or to delay, UN activity on a host of projects
relating directly or indirectly to economic and social progress.
Politics is inherent in the selection of items for the agenda of
the Council, and in the resolution of views leading to votes on draft
proposals. Political considerations are present in actions on develop-
ment funds, literacy programs, technical assistance projects, as well as
on disputed points of draft declarations and conventions relating to
human rights and improvement of the conditions of labor.
Opportunities present themselves continually in the work of the
Economic and Social Council, and its subsidiary and related bodies, for
conflicting ideological and political systems to utilize these media for
propaganda purposes. Decisions pertaining to the forms and extent of
assistance become maneuvering grounds between the Western Powers, the
forces of Communism, and governments that desire to remain outside of
the East-West struggle.
Politics has always been present in the choice of members of the
Economic and Social Council, as it has in selecting members of the Security
Council and the Trusteeship Council, and in filling the General Assembly
offices. There has been sharp rivalry for positions upon the Council
among Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American states. Election to the
Council takes a primary place in the objective of many of the underdeveloped
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countries. In like manner the Western Powers and the Soviet Union have
been eager to have seats upon this Council for it affords them the
opportunity to present their respective views upon economic and social
questions. All are aware that the distribution of membership has a direct
bearing upon the course of political struggle within the United Nations.
III
Trends in the Composition of the Council, 1946-1960
Since the Charter lays down no criteria for selecting the eighteen
members of the Economic and Social Council, the composition is left to
the workings of international rivalry, diplomacy, and political action
within the General Assembly.
It may be recalled that efforts were made at the San Francisco
Conference in 1945 to write some guide lines into the Charter. One pro-
posal was that the industrially important states should always be repre-
sented. Some attempts were made to set up a class of permanent members
as on the Security Council. But these suggestions were rejected in favor
of leaving complete discretion to the General Assembly. This was done
in part to avoid invidious distinctions being drawn between those who
were and were not economically and socially advanced. It was done in
part to insure flexibility of choice under changing world circumstances.
The only injunctions that were accepted were that the members should be
elected by the General Assembly, for three year terms, one-third at each
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session, and that retiring members should be eligible for immediate
re-election.
The record of elections to the Council from 1946 to 1960 shows
that this body has had a cross-section of industrially advanced countries
and nations in need of economic and technical assistance. There has been
a broad geographical distribution of the seats. And a wide diversity of
races, religious persuasions, and cultural backgrounds have been brought
to the Council to enable it to deal properly with questions of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
Taking the fourteen year period of the United Nations as a whole,
four features stand out about the composition of the Economic and Social
Council.
The first of these is the continuous re-election of the five powers
having permanent seats upon the Security Council. These have been re-
elected each time their terms have expired. No other states have been
similarly privileged. It is theoretically possible that the General
Assembly might someday not re-elect one or more of these states. This is
its prerogative. But the practice is now so firmly rooted that it is un-
likely to be changed unless some state loses its power and influence
altogether, or poses such a threat to others as to alter the fundamental
bases of the organization. Even though no state has a veto right in the
Economic and Social Council, and the Council may act without the presence
or the vote of any one or all five of the Great Powers, important decisions
are not likely to be taken, in practice, in the absence of the five or in
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the face of their concerted opposition. But it is germane that none of
them is given a right to block consideration or action on a proposal.
In the second place, the Council has had a reasonably balanced
composition along economic and social lines during the initial decade
and a half. Its membership has extended along a broad spectrum ranging
from the wealthiest, most technologically advanced Member states to
countries that are way down the scale in national income and gross
national product. The elections have brought together representatives
of capitalism and communism; those favoring socialist practices along
with adherents of private enterprise; those advocating strong guarantees
of social and human rights together with those inclined to go cautiously
or to resist international activity in this sphere.
The composite membership of the Council shows, in the third place,
that the General Assembly has effected a certain amount of political
balancing within the United Nations membership in the process of filling
this organ. Some of the smaller states that are not in a position to
make substantial contributions to the maintenance of international peace
and security, and have not been elected either frequently or at all to
the Security Council, have been elected in fair number to ECOSOC. Among
these are, for example, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Denmark, the Sudan. Similarly,
numbers of states not allied with one or another of the Great Powers,
such as Afghanistan, Finland, Indonesia, have been placed on this Council
where they have not been elected to the Security Council. There is a
certain amount of 'rough-hewing' in the balancing process. For in any
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given year current political considerations always influence the choices
that are made. But taken by and large diplomacy has accomplished an
eminently reasonable distribution of electoral honors among the UN Members
taking all of the Councils, the International Court of Justice, the chief
Assembly offices, and other commissions and agencies into account.
In the fourth place, the Assembly has given the Economic and Social
Council a broadly balanced geographical membership. There has been a wide
distribution of the seats among the principal regions and political
groupings. Over the fourteen year period the older, non-Asian Common-
wealth countries including the United Kingdom were elected to 12.7 per
cent of the total seats on the Council. The Latin American countries
held 20.6 per cent of the seats; the Western European states 19.6; the
Eastern European states and the U.S.S.R. 18.6 per cent. The Asian,
Middle Eastern, and African states combined, but not counting China,
were elected to 17.6 per cent of the total places on the Council. The
United States and China held the balance of the seatings.
By comparing these figures with the relative positions of the
various groups in the overall membership of the United Nations, averaged
between 1946 and 1959, the relative fairness of their representation,
mathematically speaking, may be seen. This is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 1
ELECTIONS TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Year Session Common-
wealth
Latin
American
Western
Euronean
Eastern
European
Afro-Asian
1946 I - 1 U.K.(2)
Canada(3)
1946 1 - 2 New
Zealand
1947 II U.K.
Australia
1948 III
1949 IV Canada
1950 V
1951 VI
1952 VII
U.K.
Australia
1953 VIII U.K.
Colombia(l)
Cuba(2)
Chile(3)
Peru(3)
"Venezuela
Brazil
Peru
Chile
Greece(1)
Norway(2)
Belgium(3)
France(3)
Nether-
lands (2)
Denmark
Belgium
France
Yugoslavia(l)
Ukraine(1)
U.S.S.R.(2)
Czechoslo-
vakia(2)
Byelo-Russia
India(2)*
Lebanon(1)
Lebanon
Turkey
U.S.S.R.
Poland
India*
Czechoslo-
vakia
Mexico
Uruguay
Argentina
Cuba
Venezuela
Ecuador
Sweden U.S.S.R.
Poland
Bel gium
France
Norway
Yugoslavia
U.S.S.R.
Czechoslo-
vakia
Iran
Pakistan
Philippines
Egypt
Turk %
India
Pakistan*
1954 IX
1955 X Canada
1956 XI U.K.
1957 XII
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Chile
Costa Rica
France
Nether-
lands
Greece
Finland
France
Nether-
lands
Egypt
Yugoslavia
Poland
Indonesia
Pakistan*
.Sudan
Others
China(3)
U.S. (1)
U.S.
China
U.S.
China
U.S.
China
U.S.
China
weal h Ame ica
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Figure 1 - Continued
Year Session Common-
wealth
Latin
American
Western
European
Eastern
European
Afro-Asian
1958 XIII
1959 XIV
Total Seats
Held
New
Zealand
U.K.
13
Venezuela
Brazil
21
Spain
Denmark
20
Bulgaria
Poland
U.S.S.R.
19
Afghanistan
Japan
18
Also member of Commonwealth.
resigned by Belgium.
** Elected for 2-year term to fill out seat
Figure 2
COMPARISON OF GROUP REPRESENTATION ON ECOSOC 1946 To 1959
WITH AVERAGED RELATIVE POSITION OF GROUP IN
UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP
% of total ECOSOC
seats held by group
1946-60
Averaged % of group in
UN membership, 1946 and 1959
Commonwealth
Latin American
Western European
Eastern European
Asian-African
Others
U.S.
11
12.7
20.6
19.6
18.6
17.6
7.5
30.3
16.6
11.5
29.4
wealth American
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Thus, it will be seen that there has been a relatively close
correspondence in the case of the Western European states between their
averaged percentage of the UN membership and the percentage of the
seatings they have held on ECOSOC. The Eastern European states and the
Commonwealth have enjoyed a preferential place upon ECOSOC in terms of
their percentage of the UN membership. The Asian-African and the Latin
American states, by contrast, have had a notably "under-represented*
place in terms of their averaged percentage of the UN membership, even
before the admission of the new African states in 1960.
If the General Assembly were seeking to have the Economic and
Social Council composed upon a purely pro-rata basis, the Eastern
European-Soviet bloc states should have fewer seats and the Latin
American and Asian-African combinations more. There is no precise
definition of what constitutes "under" and "over" representation, but
it is obvious that the Eastern European states have had a most generous
seating upon this Council.
Taken by and large the General Assembly has managed to reconcile
fairly well the needs and desires of most groups of Members for participa-
tion in the Economic and Social Council. The main exception exists in
the case of the Asian and African countries of which we shall speak
presently.
Each of the groups has some problem with respect to representation
upon ECOSOC. In most instances this is not insoluble and is in the process
of being worked out. The Commonwealth members face a question of how to
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handle the election of their Asian and African partners. Up to this time
they have preferred to stand for election as Asian or African states.
But with the large increase in the numbers of Members from these regions
now in process, it may be necessary, or expedient, for India, Pakistan,
Ceylon, Malaya, Ghana, and others destined to follow shortly, to stand
as Commonwealth nominees at least until the Council can be enlarged. This
would mean longer intervals between participation in the Council for the
older members of the Commonwealth. But this may have to be faced until
a suitable enlargement of the Council can be obtained through amendment
of the Charter in order to facilitate somewhat more equitable Asian-
African participation.
The Latin American states face the problem of distributing their
seatings so that the Central American and Caribbean republics, which are
in need of economic and technical assistance, can sit more frequently
on the Council.
For the Western European states, which have rotated smoothly, the
principal question is one of making adequate provision for the inclusion
of the Southern European countries, and such neutrals as Austria and
Ireland, in the scheme of rotation.
The Eastern European states face somewhat the same type of
question with respect to the Balkan satellites in their round of repre-
sentation. They also must consider making some concession from their
relatively large proportionate representation to accommodate the under-
represented Asian-African states or be willing to amend the Charter to
enlarge the Council.
It may be interesting to call attention in passing to Finland's
election in 1956 on the Western rather than the Eastern European quota
one year after its admission to the United Nations. Aside from the fact
that the Scandinavian seat happened to be up for election that year, and
that the naming of Finland to fill this was appropriate in view of its
membership in the Nordic Council, there can be little doubt that this
was intended as a testimonial of the esteem in which this nation is held
by the Free World. It was also a token that the majority of the United
Nations regard Finland as a part of the Western European community in
the broadest sense.
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IV
The Problem of Asian and African Representation
The major problem concerning the composition of the Economic and Social
Council is how to afford the now greatly enlarged circle of Asian and African
countries a proportionate representation.
When the United Nations was formed there were eleven countries from
the Asian-African area, including the Republic of China, among the 50 origin-
al Member states. By the end of 1946 the number had grown to fourteen, or
25.4 per cent of the then total membership of 55 states. In camposing the
Economic and Social Council during the initial elections, three of the 18
seats were voted to states of this part of the world, exclusive of the seat
that went to China as one of the powers having a permanent seat on the Se-
curity Council. This seemed a fair arrangement. It gave these states the
same number of seats that were accorded to the Latin American and Western
European states. This was not as favorable a ratio as the Eastern European
states received, but it was mathematically more advantageous than the four
seats that had to be shared among the 20 Latin American republics.
Aside from China, which has been continuously re-elected to the
Council along with the other Sponsoring Powers of 1945, the African and
Asian representation has been divided so that there has regularly been
one Middle Eastern state, one Asian Commonwealth power, and a third party
from somewhere in the area upon the Council. The latter seat has fluctu-
ated between a Far Eastern state, a second Commonwealth country, a Middle
Eastern or an African nation.
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Prominent in the record is the fact, that up to 1960 only one wholly
African country had been a menber of the Council: the Sudan, elected in
1957. The Sudanese precedence over two original Members of the organiza-
tion, Ethiopia and Liberia, can be attributed to the fact that it is a mem-
ber of the League of Arab States and had their energetic backing, while the
others were not members of a comparable political action grouping.
In nearly every elect;on since 1950 a multi-sided contest has de-
veloped among the Asian-African countries for the available seat. Notwith-
standing the extensive caucusing of these countries prior to elections,
sharp competitions have occurred in the balloting.
It was possibly a mistake at the beginning to treat the Asian-African
area as one for purposes of filling seats upon the Economic and Social Coun-
cil. It encompasses two continents. As someone has said, six Europes
could be fitted into it. In addition to sheer size and diversity of races,
religions, languages and economic conditions, there are wide differences in
the interests of the states in the area.
The Asian and African Governments have lent credence, nevertheless,
to the notion of their compromising a meaningful combination by their own
continual talk of Afro-Asian collaboration, by the Bandung Conference, and
by their active and well organized caucus. Furthermore, they have sought
on many occasions to speak with one voice in UN affairs. Thus, the group-
ing has been intentionally perpetuated. It is a question how long this may
continue in the light of the increase in the number of African states. For
these countries have their own problems and interests that are distinct from
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those of the Asian states, as manifest by the formation of their own caucus
and the African collaborative movement.
A moment's reflection upon the membership situation will show why dis-
parities exist in representation upon this Council and why pressures for chamge
are beginning to mount.
In 1956 there were 25 Asian and African Member states, not counting
China or Israel. Following the admission of the new states on September 20,
1960, the bi-continental presence in the United Nations numbered 43, again
not counting China and Israel, out of a total UN Membership of 96 states.
With the three or four other African countries to be admitted before the end
of 1960, the grand total will stand at or close to one hundred, of which the
Asian-African Members will comprise 46 or 47, with more to follow in the next
year or two.
In short, from the beginning of the Fifteenth Session of the General
Assembly the Asian-African states constituted hh per cent of the membership
of the United Nations. On a population basis, using the 1958 UN demographic
estimates, and excluding the peoples of China, the Asian and African peoples
account for at least 50 per cent of the population of the United Nations.
Such figures afford strong arguments for the Asian-African states
having more than three seats plus that of China on the Economic and Social
Council.
However desirable it may be to do something about the composition of
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other elective organs of the United Nations, early readjustment of the
representation on the Economic and Social Council is almost a necessity.
The large needs of the underdeveloped countries for assistance in advanc-
ing their economic and social progress underline their eagerness to have a
larger representation upon the Council. The multiplication in Asian and
African membership, compared with all other groups, supplies a powerful
case either for some reallocation of the existing seats or an enlargement
of the Council.
How much of a change is needed to afford what might be deemed a
reasonable representation for the Asian-African states?
One might suppose that there should be enough places so that there
could regularly be at least one Far Eastern State, an Indian Ocean country,
a Middle Eastern state, a North African state (comprising those lying be-
tween Morocco on the West and Somalia on the East), and one West or Central
African state on the Council at the sane time, aside from China. In other
words, five seats instead of the present three. If all of the African po-
litical entities that are in being or in prospect come into the UN within
the next two years, the African Members could conceivably argue that they
should have not less than four seats for their own representation. They
could base their argument on the ratios of representation previously em-
ployed for Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Commonwealth.
.1. See Norman J. Padelford, "Politics and Change in the Security Council,"
International Organization, Summer, 1960, pp. 381-l01.
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If the principle of equitable geographical distribution is to be ob-
served, the Asian and African states taken together should be afforded a
minimum of two more places on the Economic and Social Council than they now
have. And it would hardly be unreasonable in them if they should ask for
more than this by 1962.
There are two things that might be done to accord f airer representa-
tion to these states. One would be to redistribute the existing seatings.
In general, the grotup tfiat should be prepared to make the first and prin-
cipal concession in this direction should be the Eastern European-Soviet
bloc states which have had the largest proportionate representation to UN
membership. A temporary expedient that might be attempted within the limits
of the present arrangement, if the parties concerned would agree, would be
to make two additional seats available to the Asian-African combination by
a rotating relinquishment involving the present seatings of the Eastern
European, the Western European, and the Commonwealth states. By careful
arrangement this could be done without requiring either of these groups
to curtail its own representation by a full place all of the time. To
succeed, such an arrangement would demand willingness by the members of
each group to forego one place in tunn. Refusal by any state in line for
election to postpone its candidacy could throw the entire scheme off. Such
relinquishment or delay might seem disadvantageous or intolerable at some
times. The chances of such an expedient succeeding are hardly bright.
An arrangement that would give the Asian and African states an im-
proved representation without requiring others to forego what they have
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been accustomed to for fifteen years would be preferred by many. This can
be done only by enlarging the Council. Such an enlargement can be accom-
plished only by amending the Charter. To do this requires approval by the
General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the Member states, in-
cluding all five of the powers having permanent seats upon the Security
Council. To date the Soviet Union has categorically opposed amendment of
the Charter. At the 1959 General Assembly the Soviet delegation stated
it would not consider any amendment until Red China is admitted to the
United Nations and has had a chance to act on the matter. Conceivably the
USSR would change its position if an amendment to enlarge the Council were
passed by the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the Member
states including the otherpermanent members of the Security Council. But
again it might not do so. It has it within its power to frustrate the en-
tire membership of the United Nations if it chooses to do so. It has shown
few qualms about doing so in the past. So long as it adheres to its present
stance there can be no adjustment of the representation situation through
enlargement of the Council. The United States, the United Kingdom, France,
and the overwhelming majority of UN Members have stated their belief that
something should be done and the readiness of their Governments to proceed.
The world waits upon Moscow.
Premier Khrushchev's ostentatious professions of support for the
former colonial peoples at the Fifteenth General Assembly, together with
his unrealistic proposals for changes in the office of the Secretary Gen-
eral, could herald a change in the Soviet position. But until this is
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spelled out in positive terms on specific proposals for enlargement of the
Council there can be no certainty that the Premier's performance represents
anything more than a propaganda barrage at one extreme or a deliberate game
to undermine the basic foundations of the United Nations.
V
Moves toBring Council Abreast of Present UN Membership
The principal move so far for enlarging the Economic and Social Coun-
cil was initiated at the 1956 session of the General Assembly by a group of
sixteen Latin American states and Spain. This began the year after it be-
came obvious that it would not be practicable to convene a General Charter
Review Conference as originally contemplated at the end of ten years. The
Hispanic-American proposal called upon the General Assembly to consider
amending the Charter to increase the size of the Security Council, the
Economic and Social Council, and the International Court of Justice in the
light of the then expanded membership of the UN. 2 The proposals have con-
sistently called for an addition of six new seats to increase the Economic
and Social Council to 24 members.
In opposing the proposal the Soviet Union and its satellites have
argued that the organization in its present form meets the "essential pur-
poses" of the United Nations. They have insisted that no amendment can be
considered in the absence of Red China. Since it has not been possible to
2. See Document A/3139, June 26, 1956.
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budge the Soviet Union from this position, many of the Asian states have
preferred to put off a direct vote on the question. Thus, the proposal
has been reintroduced and debated each year but no final action taken.
The debates have revealed nevertheless the existence of a widespread
feeling that the membership of the Economic and Social Council should be ex-
panded at the earliest possible date. Assembly resolutions have recorded
this sentiment. And as the Sudanese delegate remarked at the Fourteenth
Session, simply because the Soviet Union does not like the exclusion of Red
China from the United Nations is no fair ground for refusing to accord Mem-
ber states that are in no wise responsible for the Chinese situation equit-
able representation upon the principal organs of the United Nations.3
There is a sharp distinction of course between the functions and
powers of the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council. Many
of the matters dealt with in ECOSOC are of a technical nature and the Coun-
cil has no power to bind Member states by its decisions as can the Security
Council. Having such considerations in view, many delegations, including
the United States and the United Kingdom, have taken the position that an
anendment to increase the size of the Economic and Social Council can be
regarded as "essentially a technical adjustment" to help this organ func-
tion more effectively. The Soviet Union has not been prepared, as yet, how-
ever, to go along with such a move.h
3. Special Political Committee, 130th meeting, October 17, 1959.
4. See Document A/SPC/SR 128, October 15, 1959.
It is no satisfactory answer to say, as delegates from the Soviet Union
have done, that the Asian and African countries can attend Council meetings
whenever there is a matter of particular concern to any of their number.
This privilege does not give them a vote. And any self-respecting group of
states would regard indefinite impotence on the sidelines as an intolerable
indignity. One can imagine the Soviet reaction if it were compelled to go
for years without opportunity of membership on ECOSOC or other organ of the
United Nations.
The argument that a council of twenty-four would be unwieldy carries
little weight. The regional economic commissions operate with memberships
as large as or larger than this. The Economic Commission for Europe has
twenty-nine members. The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East has
twenty-four. The Economic Commission for Latin America has twenty-four.5
The Governing Body of the International Labor Organization has forty members.
The Executive Board of UNESCO has twenty-four members. The Council of the
Food and Agriculture Organization has representatives of twenty-four govern-
ments on it. The Board of governors on the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy has twenty-three members. Each of these Commissions and Specialized Agen-
cies which reports to the Economic and Social Council considers matters of the
same nature as the Council itself. In fact, they consider many matters in
first instance that later come to the Council, or act on recommendations of
5. The Economic Commission for Africa originally had 15 regular and 8 asso-
ciate members. This presumably will be changed following the admission
of the new states in 1960.
the Council. They manage to function adequately with a membership approximat-
ing that proposed far ECOSOC.
The addition of six elective seats would permit the allocation of two
or three more places to the Asian-African states. One seat could appropri-
ately be allocated to the Western European region for assignment principally
to the states of Southern Europe. One could be assigned to the Latin American
states, and one could be considered as a floating seat to be open to general
election or to balance representation wherever it may be needed.
This would result in a Council having something like five or even
possibly six Asian-African members, four or five Latin American, four Western
and Southern European states, three Eastern European, and one or two Common-
wealth countries, together with the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
China and the Soviet Union.
Some such distribution would bring the representation on the Economic
and Social Council more nearly into line with the actualities of today's UN
membership and the problems that face the organization in the next five
years. It would alleviate one of the principal organizational shortcom-
ings today.
VI
Possible Effects of Change -- U. S. Interests
There is no dilemma posed by an enlargement of the Economic and Social
Council comparable to that which exists with respect to an increase in the
membership of the Security Council. In this case there is no issue over an
extension of the veto power. There is no comparable problem regarding the
election of countries that are pursuing neutralist or pacifist policies.
The main questions that have to be considered are what the possible ef-
fects of an increase would be on the business of the Council and on the
outcome of its deliberations.
More would doubtless be heard in an enlarged Council about increas-
ing the amounts of economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped
economies. This is likely to happen in any event. Proposals would probab-
ly be pressed for larger measures of assistance to be channeled through the
United Nations rather than via bilateral arrangements. This again will
probably occur regardless of enlargement. Pressures might be mounted to
put the Council on record in favor of the establishment of larger capital
funds for short-run projects along the lines of the United Nations Special
Fund, or for long-term capital grants according to less precise criteria
than those demanded under the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment. But again this seems likely to happen in the General Assembly
even if the Council is left as it is. More commissions, agencies and in-
strumentalities might be sought. Votes on questions relating to principles
of economic and social advancement, where lines might become drawn between
private enterprise and state planning, would become closer than they have
been for most of the newer governments are wedded to the notion that social-
ist or neo-socialist type planning and control holds assurance of the most
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rapid economic and social advancement for their countries. And conceivably
efforts would be made to get more sweeping declarations voted on human rights
about which certain quarters in the United States have expressed consider-
able hesitancy.
The question that will concern governments mainly will be what the
probable consequences of an enlargement will be upon the voting patterns
and balance of strength within the Council.
It is difficult to predict precisely how the membership of an en-
larged Council would vote on various questions. Much will depend upon who is
on the Council at the time, what the nature of the proposal in question is,
who has introduced it, and what views are held on the matter by the various
powers and how strongly they are pressed. There might be divisions of some-
thing like 14 to 10, generally speaking, in favor of a stand on which the
United States felt strongly and made particular appeals for support, as a
consequence of some division of the Asian or African vote and possibly sane
split in the Latin American voting. Should the Commonwealth or the full
Latin American vote be cast on the opposite side, the margin would become
narrower of course and might even place the United States in the minority.
It will be remenbered that only a simple majority of those present and vot-
ing is needed for action in this Council.
Although the Economic and Social Council can only make recommendations,
governments will nonetheless be concerned with outcomes with respect to im-
portant issues. This will be especially true of governments that are sensi-
tive to collective opinion and are large contributors to UN funds and pro-
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grams. For no country relishes the prospect of being outvoted or find-
ing itself in a minority position.
Most of those who would be added to the Council would listen with
attention to American and Western European views and are not likely to
force proposals to a show-down that would embarrass the United States or
fail to receive tangible support from it -- unless perhaps a "colonialism"
issue is involved. For Members are aware of the extent to which the United
States is supporting the organization.
The tragic events in the Congo and the urgent need for economic,
technical, and administrative assistance on an unparalleled scale have
changed the magnitude of the economic and social problems confronting
the United Nations. It will not be surprising if the costs for one year
of emergency assistance to the Congo run to considerably over $100 mil-
lion. They may come to a good deal more. And something on the order of
$50-100 million a year may be needed for some time before the Congo is
ready to function adequately with its own trained personnel and facili-
ties.
The magnitude of the problem such a development poses is realized
when it is recalled that the total the United Nations has been raising
annually from contributions for its regular activities has been a little
over $58 million. Special assessments and in addition special voluntary
contributions will have to be resorted to for support of the Congo acti-
vities as they were for Suez and other operations. These may fall short
of what is needed, as have the assessments and contributions for the UN
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Emergency Force in Egypt. Nor is this the end. Secretary-General Ham-
marskjold has signalled the need for a Special Fund for Africa to aid
other new nations in this continent. With so many peoples intent on
telescoping time in acquiring independence and advancing the material
aspects of their societies to higher standards of living, emergencies
may arise calling for larger and exceptional farms of assistance elsewhere.
As Mr. Hammarskjold pointed out when he asked for support of United
Nations action in the Congo: a solution to problems of this nature may be
"a question of peace or war" and not limited to one territary or nation.
For "values immeasurably greater than any of those which such action iny
be intended to protect" may be at stake -- literally world peace, human
freedom and progress.
Whether the Economic and Social Council is increased in size or
not, the powerful forces of change that are sweeping through Africa, Asia,
and other parts of the world as well are bound to press upon the United
Nations for larger and larger assistance. What has transpired in the
Congo may become an important turning point in various f acets of inter-
national relationships. It is almost certain to mark a stepping stone
to an era of heavily expanded economic and technical assistance. This
will magnify the importance of the deliberations that t ake place in the
Economic and Social Council, and increase the weight of its recommenda-
tions to the General Assembly, the Specialized Agencies, and to Members
of the world organization.
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VII
Conclusions
Taking the various factors into consideration, it seems to the
present writer that on balance the time has come to move forcefully in
the direction of increasing the size of the Economic and Social Council.
This should, in my judgment, be limited to an additional six seats mak-
ing a Council of 24. And it should be done with a prior understanding
anong the UN Members on the general lines of allocation as suggested on
a preceding page.
It is my opinion, weighing the elements involved, that the United
States will find sufficient friends upon an enlarged Council, composed
along the lines mentioned, to support on most occasions positions to
which it attaches vital importance. Its views will continue to command
attention. And, barring the unforeseen, its influence will remain high
in an enlarged Council in consequence of its experience, its financial
and other resources and contributions, and its support for the rights
and independence of young and small nations. It must expect to have to
employ the arts of persuasion and play the game of politics. Indeed,
whether the Council is enlarged or not, it must be prepared to encounter
stiffer opposition and more difficult times than in the past. These can-
not be dodged; they are built into the circumstances of our times.
There is nothing to be gained, in the opinion of the writer, in
delaying action upon an enlargement of the Council. It will probably
take a minimum of one to two years to obtain the necessary ratifications
after an amendment is voted upon by the General Assembly.
A consideration that will figure prominently in the minds of many
at the United Nations will be an assurance that a proposal voted upon
favorably by the General Assembly will be laid at once before the Congress
of the United States and supported by the Executive branch of the Govern-
ment for early ratification. Such an assurance should be conveyed to other
delegations by the United States, and made clear at the earliest possible
date by the successful candidate in the Presidential election.
The Soviet Union may not be persuaded even by a two-thirds majority
in the General Assembly to change its stand on amending the Charter. The
exigencies of politics could conceivably compel it to modify its stand if
an actual vote were taken upon a draft amendment restricted to enlargement
of this particular organ. Only the presentation of an actual test will
confront the nations with the need of making a definitive decision. If
the U.S.S.R., or other Member states, find that their interests cannot be
squared in final analysis with approval and ratification of an amendment
to improve representation upon the Economic and Social Council, this can-
not be helped. It is their right to take such a decision. But it will be
clear, at least, what can and cannot be done. Diplomacy will have been
given its full opportunity to operate, which it has not been up to this
time. And if there is unmovable opposition when the cards are down, this
will stand revealed for what it is.
The membership of the United Nations has nearly doubled in size since
the Organization was founded. It is time that the elective organ primarily
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concerned with the advancement of international economic and social coopera-
tion, and jl.th the promotion of higher standards of living, were enlarged to
keep step with the characteristics of the United Nations and of world needs
todar. By enabling more of the states in Asia and Africa to have seats upon
the Economic aad Social Council, the representation of other regions can at
the sane time be improved. In the process, habits of collaboration for
search of solutions to international economic and social problems through
the United Nations mechanism will be encouraged.
